Experimentation has been regarded as an essential element of the learning process and a source of valuable evidence in natural and social sciences. This perception has not been fully accepted by law, which has been sceptical not only of experiments with legislation but also of most forms of incorporation of evidence in the lawmaking process. However, the growing demand for a better interaction between the rapidly changing society and law appears to favour a broader employment of evidence-based lawmaking instruments. Experimental laws and regulations enable legislators to gather important information regarding the nature of the underlying problem, and test the effectiveness of new legal rules on a smallscale basis for a period of time determined beforehand. In this article, I argue that experimental legislation should be part of legislators' daily toolbox and I provide an overview of the different advantages of this legislative instrument. Nonetheless, there are not only 'whys' but also 'woes' in the life of the 'experimenting legislator'. A number of political and legal objections have been raised against a broader enactment of experimental legislation. In this article, I show both sides of experimental legislation and try to unravel the truth behind these objections.
a small-scale basis, in derogation from existing law, and subject to a periodic or final evaluation. Once evaluated, an experimental law which reveals positive outcomes can be adapted in conformity with the observed results and transformed into a permanent act.
11 Experimental legislation is a first step towards lasting legislation: new rules are enacted on an experimental basis, their effects and side-effects are evaluated, and should these rules prove to be effective, they can be adapted and converted into permanent laws. 12 In addition, experimental legislation aims to be an informed step towards better lasting legislation since it allows legislators to test new laws on a small-scale basis, tackle the uncertainty and difficulty in making prognostics inherent to new rules, and to gather evidence to support (or reject) the legislators' legislative hypothesis.
The concept of 'experimental legislation' can be deconstructed into various elements. The first is its temporary character: an experimental law or regulation must have an [ab initio] limited duration. While some argue that this fixed deadline constitutes a legality requirement of any experimental law, 13 others have argued that the experiment should terminate as soon as its underlying motives cease to exist and enough evidence has been gathered in order to perform a solid evaluation of the effects of the implementation of the experimental law. 14 The second element is the derogation from current law, which implies that two requirements must be observed: firstly, there must be a statutory basis authorizing this derogation; and, secondly, it must be clear why this derogation through an experiment is necessary, meaning that the objective of the experiment must be clearly indicated. 15 These legality requirements imply that both the object of the experiment as well as the evaluation criteria must be clear and defined beforehand.
The third element is the performance of an evaluation, which is an essential feature of any experimental law since the main idea behind experimental laws is to try out a new legal regime, see if it works and learn from the observed positive and negative effects. This evaluation is regarded as an opportunity to rethink the objective of the experiment and decide whether the rules which were tried out can be extended to the rest of the population and converted into general lasting rules. The evaluation of the effects of the implementation of an experimental law can be performed by the ministry or state authority in charge of the experiment, a special governmental authority or an independent agency. 16 Finally, it is only possible to draw lessons as to the value of the experimental rules if it is possible to compare their effects to the ones resulting from the application of existing law. Experimental legislation is therefore only applied to a circumscribed part of the territory or to a representative group of citizens. A 'sample group' is thus chosen for the implementation of the deviating legal regime and the 11 results obtained here are compared with the ones of the 'control group' to which the legislative status quo is applied.
Experimental legislation is a distinctive form of legal experimentation and it can even be qualified as the most radical one since it is an experiment with the rights and duties of citizens with a direct impact on society and the economy. This is not the case with other forms of experimentation with laws which are discussed in the following section.
Other forms of experimentation with law
Experimental legislation coexists with a number of other instruments that have an investigational character but do not produce immediate changes in the legal order, which is the case with internal legislative experiments; 17 and hybrid forms of experimentation that combine policy and legislative techniques, notably pilot projects and the Dutch proeftuinen; and phased implementation of legislative instruments which try to progressively adapt legislation to the new generated information without assuming an explicit experimental nature. 
Experimental legislation and scientific experiments
The experimental character of the legislative instrument that is the focus of this article may often evoke the stigma attached to scientific experiments which may partially justify the scepticism towards experimental laws and even legislative experiments. 24 Similarly to scientific experiments, experimental legislation aims to find further information so as to verify or refute a hypothesis. 25 In case of a scientific experiment, this is done by introducing an intervention (e.g. a novel medical treatment) or a manipulation of a variable and observing its effects so as to 'explore one or more causes of a phenomenon'.
26
Conclusions can only be validly drawn if the intervention is applied to one group (treatment group) and the results obtained here are compared to the ones obtained in another group to which a placebo or a different treatment was given (control group). The terms 'treatment' and 'control' groups between which comparisons are being made refer to 'Fisher's golden standard'. 27 In order to guarantee the internal and external validity of the information obtained, subjects should be randomly assigned to these two groups and the experiment should be conducted under controlled conditions (often in a laboratory not been previously tested in a laboratory? The answer is a clear 'no': firstly, experimental legislation only tests the effectiveness of rules and not the safety of products or services; secondly, although experimental laws share a comparable logic with scientific experiments, they abide by different rules.
It is not feasible to randomly assign citizens for the sake of the implementation of experimental regulations, but an objective selection based, for example, on demographic criteria may suffice to define two groups that are representative of the general population. To wit, the experimental rules are applied to the most densely populated provinces of a country or to the ones that are sufficiently diverse to provide a good representation of the population; while existing law remains valid in the rest of the country. It is also neither achievable nor necessary to ask for individual consent for the implementation of an experimental regulation since this consent is implicit in the legislative power. Experimental laws and regulations are not extraordinary measures; instead, they are regular legislative instruments at the disposal of legislators.
Citizens should therefore not be afraid of experimental regulations or even legislative experiments because these can never be 'too scientific' 29 and cannot be confused with laboratory experiments. Experimental legislation is neither a perfect translation of the scientific method to law nor does it aim to perform this role. Instead, experimental legislation is an instrument enacted to 'search for facts' that evidence the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of new legal provisions.
C. The whys of experimental legislation
The core function of experimental legislation is to "examine if a particular measure will effectively [and often efficiently] achieve certain goals". 30 Nonetheless, this information-gathering can be both a goal pursued on its own and a means put at the service of other functions. To wit, this legislative instrument can be used to find information about laws which are controversial due to the change they introduce in society or in the legal order or considering the lack of information as to their effects. The enactment of an experimental law can be used to gather social support which would be otherwise impossible. The supporters of a new law will hope that the experimental law will deliver evidence as to the effectiveness of this law, convincing the opponents as to its enactment. 1. Experimental legislation as an information-production instrument "Legislating is [always] an experiment with human destinies" because legislators are never fully aware of the effects and side-effects that a law can produce. 32 Moreover, the complexities of legislating and regulating in a fast changing world can be partially attributed to the undeniable cognitive bias that characterizes the information-intensive lawmaking process. 33 On the one hand, legislators are daily confronted with information asymmetries regarding these new and complex societal, technological or economic problems. 34 On the other, they lack information as to most effective legislative instruments to tackle the former. Legislators can only try to predict what the best laws would be but, as it has been argued in the literature, legislators should ensure that these predictions are informed judgments, based on the available facts-evidence-based lawmaking-and tend less towards opinion-based lawmaking, which often depart from abstract theories and political statements. 35 In addition, the cognitive bias can also be tackled by adopting new legal rules for a limited period of time and on a small-scale basis so as to observe the effects of their implementation and draw lessons from them. 36 Experimental legislation can assist the use of other evidence-based lawmaking instruments by explicitly converting the lawmaking process into an iterative learning path where evidence resulting from experimentation is taken into account to improve the legislative activity in the next round. These aspects deserve further attention.
(a) Experimental legislation, information-production, and evidence-based lawmaking Although information is "the lifeblood of regulatory policy" and legislation, legislators will not always dispose of this information: sometimes private actors will refuse to disclose it; other times, information concerning the effectiveness of new laws may not even exist. Legislating without sufficient information may be however risky, this is why experimenting with laws before one legislates 'for good' 37 can avoid that 'all human destinies' are exposed to legislative failures. 
Experimental legislation as a 'consensus-finder' instrument
Legislation is not only the result of the consideration of distinct interests and rationalities but also of a consensus among political parties. Nonetheless, reaching an agreement in the context of socially or economically controversial bills can be easier said than done. Divided governments and significant political opposition are often reflected in legislative fragmentation, frequent legislative revisions or the imposition of future reconsiderations of laws. 59 In addition, this political consensus can be difficult to obtain when public opinion is divided. Experimental legislation has often been chosen as a mechanism to achieve social or political consensus which appeared to be absent at the Parliamentary or Senatorial levels. This occurs namely when there is a conflict of multiple interests or when information as to the potential (negative) effects of law is lacking. The adoption of experimental laws increases the probability that political opponents will support new laws due to the 'promise' of future evaluation or revision. 60 In the United States, experimentation often emerges in the legal order under the cover of a sunset clause 61 but it has been argued in the literature that an experimentalist motivation clearly underlies these sunset clauses. from a psychiatric hospital. 63 As a result of the pressure to react to this incident, the State of New York approved a law directed at people with mental illness who, in view of their medical history, could not survive in the community without medical assistance and could be therefore submitted to involuntary outpatient treatment. It was not necessary to provide evidence that these patients constituted a real risk to society in general. The lack of compliance with this treatment plan would justify the involuntarily admission of the patient to a hospital for a seventy-two hours evaluation period. The adoption of an experimental statute was justified by the need to obtain more information on the implementation of this new system and its impact on the reduction of criminality among psychiatric patients. Since this act was highly contested, its adoption as a temporary act with an experimental character opened the possibility to reach a compromise and later to convince the opponents or sceptics of the positive effects of these new rules produced.
Accommodation of diversity and advancement of decentralized forms of government
We live in a 'world of standards': they ensure compatibility and interoperability of information and communications in a global world, facilitate coordination and cooperation among organizations in different continents, and increase efficiency and effectiveness. 64 Policy and legislative standardization may be economically desirable but in countries characterized by strong internal diversity this can lead to disastrous policies. In the anthropological study by James Scott, Seeing like a State, excessive standardization, lack of local autonomy and disrespect for diversity are pointed out as causes for the failure of so-called 'high-modernist' projects supposedly designed to ameliorate the human condition. 65 As Scott explains, citizens do not have uniform needs or interests and this is obvious when comparing different communities. A higher level of flexibility and minimum harmonization as to the instruments to be used in order to achieve national goals can produce more satisfactory results.
In Germany and France experimental laws have been implemented at the local level with the objective of enhancing the self-administration of municipalities, 66 or furthering the autonomy of French local authorities [collectivités territoriales]. 67 In France, a constitutional right to experiment was granted privileged mechanism to further the decentralization process. The revision of the French Constitution establishes a 'right to experiment'. Both the national government and the regional authorities are allowed to experiment (see articles 37 (1) and 72 (4), respectively). This constitutional revision did not introduce any substantial novelty but it limited itself to the acknowledgement of the legislative practice.
D. EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: THE WOES
In the previous sections, the advantages and the different functions of experimental legislation were listed and explained. However, this legislative instrument remains underused due to a number of reasons.
Firstly, experimental legislation is often dismissed with a 'no, because I said so' type of argument, which usually indicates that lawmakers are not aware of the functionalities of this legislative instrument.
Secondly, when experimental legislation is considered by lawmakers, it might be refused by politicians or interest groups. This may occur either at the enactment level, when politicians fear that experimental laws will prove them wrong or after the evaluation, when politicians turn a blind eye to the obtained results, preventing experimental laws from being taken seriously. Thirdly, when the first and second obstacles have been overcome, experimental legislation may not survive ethical and legal objections, notably as to the potential violation of the principles of legal certainty and equal treatment. In this section, I discuss these 'woes' in the life of the experimenting legislator.
Experimental legislation: 'no, because I said so'
It has been argued that the reduced number of policy experiments in the United States is often more connected with the lack of awareness or knowledge as to the functionalities of these instruments than with true scepticism. 69 This reasoning appears to be applicable to experimental legislation as well. In addition, policy and lawmakers frequently do not have sufficient information, resources or know-how to enact and implement them. 70 Furthermore, even when this information is available, politicians and policymakers often do not take full advantage of it. 71 This can be attributed to the fact that policymakers have excessively optimistic beliefs about the effects and side-effects of policies, dismissing the importance of experiments. Not much formation or information is required to enact experimental legislation; therefore, 68 Article 72 (4) of the French Constitution reads: "In the manner provided for by an Institutional Act, except where the essential conditions for the exercise of public freedoms or of a right guaranteed by the Constitution are affected, territorial communities or associations thereof may, where provision is made by statute or regulation, as the case may be, derogate on an experimental basis for limited purposes and duration from provisions laid down by statute or regulation governing the exercise of their powers". However, as previously mentioned, legislators may tend, particularly in times of crisis, to favour opinion instead of evidence-based policy and legislation. An example is the EU experiment with reduced VAT rates on labour intensive services which aimed at reducing unemployment and the black economy. At the end of the four-year period, the participating Member States provided the European Commission with information regarding the evaluation of the experiment. 79 The reports were far from enthusiastic. Based on this evidence, the Commission concluded that there was no direct causal link between reduced VAT rates and job creation. 80 Furthermore, evidence from some Member States also suggested that the lower VAT rates were not fully reflected in prices. 81 The Member States involved in the experiment claimed that the measure did not have a substantial impact on employment. In conclusion, the reduced VAT rates If the results of experimental laws are not taken seriously, the value and reputation of experimental legislation shall be endangered since this instrument will be easily transformed into a puppet in the hands of politicians.
(c) Experimental legislation: 'yes, but is it legal?'
A number of legal objections could be raised against experimental legislation. In this section, I
consider the potential violation of the principle of legal certainty and equal treatment. In a world characterized by uncertainty, fear and risks, citizens turn to law as a safe harbour, where certainty, stability and continuity reign. 82 Laws are expected to be not only knowable to the average citizen, uniformly applied and regarded as a safeguard against the arbitrariness of public administration, 83 but also to last. This static perception of legal certainty appears to be threatened by experimental legislation which carries two types of uncertainty: firstly, as to the continuity of the law;
secondly, as to the future of experimental laws themselves. They are more uncertain since an experiment can expire at the end of the determined period, be terminated before it, renewed, or converted into a permanent law.
The Dutch Council of State has expressed on numerous occasions its apprehension as to the tension between experimental legislation and the principle of legal certainty. 84 This institution has not been the only one to point out this possible conflict. Not rarely do parliamentary discussions refer to the same constraint. 85 There is however a difference between the uncertainty allegedly caused by experimental legislation experienced by 'the average citizen' on the one hand and by entrepreneurs on the other. The latter are endowed with better means to making prognoses about and prepare for future changes of legislation. Even though 'average citizens' might find it inconvenient to be exposed to the temporal delimitation or future amendment of laws, this does not mean that an experimental law or regulation exposes them to a 'bare uncertainty' regarding the future legislative developments, as claimed in a recent German case before the Berlin Labour Court. 86 If private actors hesitate to invest due to the lack of trust in experimental legislation, this can have negative repercussions on the competitiveness of an economic sector and the implementation of innovation policy. Nonetheless, this effect has not been demonstrated empirically and thus remains at the theoretical level. Entrepreneurs do not expect to have absolute certainty: uncertainty is accepted as 'part of the innovative business'. 87 Experimental laws grant sufficient certainty if they are enacted within the above described framework: for a predetermined period; with an explicit goal; and submitted to an evaluation according to evaluation criteria.
In addition, a static concept of legal certainty makes little sense in the 21 st century. This may be a controversial statement that does not match, for example, the argumentation presented in the article by Pauline Westerman also published in this issue. However, it is important to underline that in the last few decades, the concept of legal certainty has evolved and one should be aware that in a fast changing society, laws are unable to keep pace with social and technological developments and foresee all the legal certainty has to be interpreted dynamically. In this scenario, experimental legislation can represent a 'blessing' rather than a 'curse' for legal certainty, since experimental laws can be used to adapt the legal order to structural changes, without disrupting it. New rules are first tried, citizens can adapt to these novelties; and slowly but surely, these legislative changes can be extended to the rest of the country. 89 Patricia Popelier argues that the instruction 10a of the Dutch Instructions for Rulemaking (aanwijzingen voor regelgeving) appears to design experimental regulation as a transition mechanism between old and new legal rules. 90 In the German literature, experimental laws have been equally described as 'preliminary' legislative acts that are conceived to generate knowledge and experience and by this to reduce the uncertainty connected with the effects of new legal rules. 91 The German Constitutional Court has agreed with the literature and argued, in the context of a case on the regulation of geriatric care, that "the introduction of an experimental clause was essential to create room for the temporary test of integrated and general forms of education and training [of geriatric care professionals] with novel contents and specializations related to the occupational area'. 92 To sum up, experimental legislation can be an instrument at the service of legal certainty. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to enquire whether this instrument also observes the principle of equal treatment.
In the context of the implementation of an experimental law or regulation, not all citizens will be equal before the law: the sample group will be bound by the experimental rules, whereas for the control group the previously existing rules or standards will be valid. The Aristotelian formula 'treat equals equally and unequals unequally'-though extensively accepted-does not translate the concrete meaning of the principle of equal treatment. It has been acknowledged that a differentiation in granting privileges can be however authorized "if [it results] from the nature of the case that there cannot be a general participation". 93 This is exactly the case of experimental legislation, where a differentiation between the sample and control groups is essential to obtain valid results. Notwithstanding this possibility, the German Constitutional Court has established that this differentiation is constrained by the principle of proportionality and the prohibition of arbitrariness. Therefore, any differentiation on an experimental basis must be objectively justified; and it needs to be ensured that the differentiation in question is not excessive but proportional, and strictly connected to the goal pursued by the legislative act. 94 In 2008, the Portuguese Constitutional Court declared that the inequality resulting from the implementation of an experimental regulation could not be qualified as a violation of the principle of decree adopting a new model of experimental civil proceedings which was simplified in comparison to the ordinary one. The choice of the 'sample group' was determined on the grounds of territorial and demographic criteria. The Portuguese Constitutional Court considered that these criteria were sufficiently objective and did not give rise to discrimination. Furthermore, citizens were not 'deprived of a right or benefit' due to the application of the experimental regime since they did not have the right to a particular type of (civil) proceedings but rather to a due process of law which was guaranteed in that case. In addition, the Constitutional Court affirmed that the unequal treatment was inherent to any experiment and that this differentiated treatment was non-arbitrary and fully justified by the objective of the experiment:
to learn or obtain more information about the effectiveness of the new procedural regime.
In conclusion, the differentiated treatment introduced by an experimental law is inherent to the central goal of this legislative instrument: to produce and gather more information as to the effectiveness of a new law. A proportional and non-arbitrary differentiation for this sake shall not violate the principle of equal treatment.
E. CONCLUSION
In this article, I define and explain the concept of 'experimental legislation', distinguishing it from other apparently similar instruments. Although I provide an overview of the different functions of experimental legislation in section C, I underline that this instrument performs a central function:
information-production. Experimental legislation converts lawmaking into a learning process, giving legislators the opportunity to try, fail, and learn from their legislative mistakes. According to HoffmannRiem, this is the distinctive characteristic of this legislative instrument: the possibility to extract lessons from the experiment and use them to revise or revoke laws on the grounds of new and more effective ideas or legal instruments. 96 After having experimented with new rules, legislators will be able to make a more informed future choice between the existing rules and the ones tried on an experimental basis.
Experimental legislation gathers the evidence lawmakers require to verify or refuse the hypothesis underlying a new law (e.g. is rule x effective in the reduction of poverty?).
Experimental legislation is often dismissed due to its inconvenience: politicians may not be willing to submit their political statements to a 'reality check'. However, lawmaking should not be reduced to a mere translation of abstract theories and political statements in laws and regulations. 97 Laws result from the consideration of diverse political, social and economic interests which are brought together by stimulating a dialogue between the different actors involved in the legislative process. 98 As Adopting Roth's trilogy-though going beyond its meaning and context-lawmakers should 'search for facts, promote dialogues between politicians and theorists, and whisper the results of this process in the ears of politicians'. 100 Experimental legislation combines this tripartite process and enables legislators to learn by testing new legislative solutions on a small-scale basis.
The legal objections raised against experimental legislation should be overcome if experimental legislation is enacted within a clear legal framework. This does not require any constitutional revision as in France; rather it needs a widespread awareness among lawmakers of the general requirements to be observed and the need to ensure that political rationality does not jeopardize the results of experimental legislation. The legal objections raised against it are not solid enough to dissuade a legislator aware of the value of this legislative instrument: instead of harming legal certainty, experimental legislation can ensure the transition between 'old and new rules', avoiding sudden legislative changes; instead of violating the principle of equal treatment, experimental laws introduce a temporary differentiation which is essential to decide on the effectiveness of the laws being tested.
In conclusion, experimental legislation is a learning instrument that should be more often employed.
Up until now, experimental legislation has remained in the shadow of other legislative instruments and other forms of experimentation with law. In a time of rapid social and technological changes, legislators should dare to experiment with new legislative solutions and approaches. Errors will necessarily be committed, and it might indeed be unwise, in specific cases, to blindly accept all the results of experiments. Nonetheless, as quoted in the introduction of this article, it is the learning from these legislative mistakes that matters and puts us on the path of knowledge.
